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The Consequences of
Consequentialist Criteria
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos*
The two most significant approaches to redistricting to emerge in the
last generation are both consequentialist. That is, they both urge
authorities to design—and courts to evaluate—district plans on the basis
of the plans’ likely electoral consequences. According to the partisan
fairness approach, plans should treat the major parties symmetrically in
terms of the conversion of votes to seats. According to the competitiveness
approach, districts should be as electorally competitive as is feasible.
Unnoticed by the literature, a substantial number of jurisdictions, in
both America and Australia, have heeded these calls from the academy. In
sum, consequentialist criteria have been used to shape the district plans for
close to three hundred elections over the last four decades. In this Article, I
provide an initial assessment of the record of these criteria. The record, for
the most part, is mediocre. Controlling for other relevant factors, partisan
fairness requirements have not made district plans more symmetric in their
treatment of the major parties. Nor have competitiveness requirements
made elections more competitive. The likely explanations are the poor
drafting, low prioritization, and need for unrealistically accurate electoral
forecasts of most consequentialist criteria.
However, other common proposals for redistricting reform—in
particular, the use of neutral institutions such as commissions—have
performed much better. Elections in Australia, all of which rely on
commissions, are much fairer and more competitive than their American
counterparts. In the United States, commission usage increases both
partisan fairness in state legislative elections and competitiveness in
congressional elections, even controlling for an array of other variables.
Ironically, it seems that consequentialist criteria cannot achieve their own
desired consequences—but that non-consequentialist approaches can.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Christopher
Elmendorf, William Hubbard, Michael McDonald, Eric McGhee, and David Schleicher for their
helpful comments. My thanks also to the workshop participants at the George Washington University
Law School, Melbourne Law School, and Griffith Law School, where I presented earlier versions of
the Article.
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INTRODUCTION
The two most significant approaches to redistricting to emerge in the last
generation are both consequentialist. That is, they both urge authorities to design—
and courts to evaluate—district plans on the basis of the plans’ likely electoral
consequences. The partisan fairness approach, associated primarily with political
scientists such as Bernard Grofman and Gary King, argues that plans should treat
the major political parties symmetrically. Each party should be equally able to
convert its support from voters into legislative seats. Deviations from symmetry
should be avoided by line drawers and relied on by courts to invalidate biased
plans.
The competitiveness approach, linked to law professors such as Samuel
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, contends that districts should be as electorally
competitive as is feasible. Competition is the lifeblood of democracy because it
makes representatives accountable to voters and results in a legislature that is
responsive to changes in the electorate’s sentiments. It should therefore be
prioritized over all other considerations when the time comes to reshape districts.
It should also be invoked by courts to strike down especially uncompetitive plans.
Almost unnoticed by the literature, a number of jurisdictions, both in
America and abroad, have heeded these calls from the academy and adopted
consequentialist redistricting criteria. With respect to partisan fairness, South
Australia enacted a law in 1991 requiring districts to be drawn so that if a party
wins a majority of the popular vote, it will also win a majority of seats in the
legislature. Delaware and Hawaii have longstanding provisions barring district
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plans that “unduly favor” a party.1 And legislatures, commissions, and courts in
thirteen other U.S. states have taken partisan fairness into account on at least one
occasion since 1966.
With respect to competitiveness, laws in Arizona, Washington, and
Wisconsin include (or formerly included) it as a mandatory line-drawing criterion.
Legislatures, commissions, and courts in six other U.S. states also have sought
voluntarily to craft competitive districts at least once in the modern redistricting
era. In total, partisan fairness and competitiveness have been used to design the
district plans for close to three hundred South Australian, congressional, and state
legislative elections over the last four decades. This is a far larger universe of cases
than has previously been realized.
In this Article, I investigate the consequences of these consequentialist
criteria. I investigate, in other words, whether plans enacted pursuant to a partisan
fairness requirement actually treat the major parties more symmetrically, and
whether plans enacted pursuant to a competitiveness criterion in fact result in
more competitive elections. To carry out this investigation, I compiled the results
of all federal and state elections held in Australia since 1990, as well as South
Australian state election results since 1950. I also compiled all American
congressional and state legislative election results since 1966, when the oneperson, one-vote rule was first implemented nationwide.
Once I assembled this data, I calculated several measures of partisan fairness
and competitiveness for each jurisdiction in each election year. My measures of
partisan fairness were (1) partisan bias, i.e., the divergence in the share of seats that
each party would win given the same share of the statewide vote; and (2) the
efficiency differential, i.e., the gap between the parties’ respective “wasted” votes. My
measures of competitiveness were (1) average margin of victory, i.e., the average
difference in vote shares between the winning and losing candidates; (2) share of
competitive seats, i.e., the proportion of races decided by less than a twenty-point
margin; and (3) electoral responsiveness, i.e., the rate at which a party gains or loses
seats given changes in its overall vote share. All of these metrics are widely used by
political scientists.
At first glance, my results seem promising for advocates of consequentialist
criteria. South Australia has enjoyed lower levels of partisan bias and smaller
efficiency differentials than other Australian states since adopting its partisan
fairness rule in 1991. So too have U.S. states that have employed similar
requirements, in both congressional and state legislative elections. In terms of
competitiveness as well, average margins of victory are smaller, shares of
competitive seats are larger, and rates of electoral responsiveness are higher in U.S.

1. See HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804(4) (2002); see also HAW.
REV. STAT. § 25-2(b)(1) (2012).
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states that explicitly have tried to draw competitive districts. These effects are
particularly pronounced at the state legislative level.
Unfortunately, many of these results become less impressive when the data is
subjected to more sophisticated analysis. For example, South Australia’s partisan
bias levels and efficiency differentials are not lower than those that it featured prior
to adopting its partisan fairness requirement. Nor does South Australia’s current
advantage over its fellow states remain statistically significant when controls are
added for factors such as the year, the level of election, and the number of
districts. Similarly, statistical significance disappears in most (though not all) U.S.
models when controls are added for the redistricting institution, other linedrawing criteria, whether the state government was unified or divided, and other
relevant variables. One exception is that partisan fairness requirements continue to
reduce the efficiency differential in congressional elections. A more important
exception is that competitiveness criteria continue to decrease the average margin
of victory and increase the share of competitive seats and the level of electoral
responsiveness in state legislative elections.
What are we to make of this picture? The most obvious lesson is that
consequentialist criteria have not, to date, delivered their promised consequences,
at least not in their promised magnitude. Levels of partisan fairness and
competitiveness simply have not risen very much even when jurisdictions have
enacted requirements specifically aimed at raising them. This may be because the
provisions were drafted poorly—for instance, what does it mean to “unduly
favor” a party?2 Or it may be because the provisions were not prioritized very
highly, but rather were considered only after several other criteria were applied
first. Or, most discouragingly, it may be because redistricting authorities are largely
incapable of predicting future election results. Consequentialist criteria may not
work because electoral consequences cannot be forecasted accurately enough.
A second implication is that, to the extent that consequentialist criteria do
work, they do so most clearly in the case of competitiveness requirements applied
to state legislative elections. This is the one domain in which the use of
consequentialist criteria remained significant even after adding the full panoply of
controls. It is possible that competitiveness is easier for line drawers to predict
than partisan fairness. The various measures of competitiveness are simpler to
compute than their partisan fairness counterparts, and they are linked as well to
foreseeable factors such as the presence of incumbents. It is also possible that
state legislative elections are a more favorable setting for consequentialist criteria
than congressional elections. Their lower stakes may make district drafters more
willing to pursue goals other than partisan or bipartisan advantage. And their
larger numbers of districts may provide drafters with more cartographic flexibility

2.

See sources cited supra note 1.

2013]

CONSEQUENCES OF CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITERIA

673

while also improving the accuracy of the various metrics (which are more volatile
when the number of districts is small).
A final point is that common proposals for redistricting reform other than the
adoption of consequentialist criteria seem to work quite well. South Australia’s
partisan bias levels and efficiency differentials did not drop when it adopted its
partisan fairness requirement, but they plummeted after it instituted an
independent commission in 1975. Australian elections as a whole, all of which rely
on commissions, are much more symmetric in their treatment of the major parties,
and much more competitive, than their American analogues. In the United States,
commission usage increases partisan fairness in state legislative elections and
boosts competitiveness in congressional elections, even controlling for an array of
other factors. The use of familiar line-drawing criteria such as respect for political
subdivisions also has a strong pro-competitive effect at both the state legislative
and congressional levels. Accordingly, the relative ineffectiveness of
consequentialist criteria is no cause for despair. Less exotic reform options can
achieve many of the same consequentialist goals, while also realizing a number of
other desirable values.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the partisan fairness and
competitiveness approaches and discusses their normative foundations. Part II,
the Article’s analytical core, examines empirically the consequences of
consequentialist criteria. Finally, Part III explores some of the legal and policy
implications of the previous section’s findings.
I. CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITERIA IN THEORY
Two approaches to redistricting have dominated the academic debate over
the last generation: the partisan fairness approach, advocating that district plans
treat the major parties symmetrically, and the competitiveness approach, advising
that districts be made as competitive as is feasible.3 Both of these approaches are
consequentialist because they urge that districts be drawn on the basis of their
likely electoral consequences. In this Part, I summarize the two approaches,
present the normative theories that underlie them, and set forth some of their
respective strengths and weaknesses.
A. Partisan Fairness
The partisan fairness approach, which is “virtually a consensus position of
the [political science] community,”4 asserts that district plans should not vary in
3. See Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP. CT. REV.
409, 419–27 (presenting as two “conventional accounts” of redistricting the “partisan bias account”
and the “anticompetition account”).
4. Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan
Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 6 (2007); see also Andrew Gelman & Gary
King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 554 (1994) (“The
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their treatment of the major parties. Each party should be equally able to convert
its support among the electorate into seats in the legislature. If one party receives a
certain share of seats for a certain share of the vote, then the other party should
receive the same seat share for this vote share. Importantly, partisan fairness is not
the same thing as proportional representation. It is perfectly permissible for one
party to receive, say, 65% of seats for 55% of the vote, as long as the other party
also would receive 65% of seats were it to muster 55% of the vote.5
A particular kind of equality principle motivates the partisan fairness
approach. It is a principle that applies to political parties, not to other organized
groups or individuals. It is also a principle whose touchstone is the conversion of
statewide votes to statewide seats, not ballot access or financial resources or
efficacy in campaigning. Parties are the key entities that are understood to be
affected by redistricting, and vote-to-seat conversion is the key concept that is
understood to be at issue. As Grofman and King put it, the “idea is that
candidates of each political party should have equal opportunity in translating
voter support into the division of legislative seats between the parties.”6
Although its reasoning is notoriously difficult to grasp, the Supreme Court
decision that first recognized a cause of action for gerrymandering, Davis v.
Bandemer,7 relied in part on this partisan equality principle. The claim whose
validity the Court acknowledged was that “each political group in a State should
have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political
group.”8 Partisan fairness played almost no role in the Court’s 2004
gerrymandering decision, Vieth v. Jubelirer,9 but it resurfaced in the 2006 case of
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry.10 In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Kennedy declined to endorse the partisan fairness approach, but he
did note “its utility in redistricting planning and litigation.”11 Other Justices were
not so circumspect. Justice Stevens observed that the approach is “widely
accepted by scholars,”12 praised it as a “helpful (though certainly not talismanic)
tool,”13 and analyzed Texas’s district plan in terms of the symmetry of its
treatment of the major parties.14 Similarly, Justice Souter cited the “utility of a

vast majority of American political scientists have adopted the normative position that healthy
representative democracies have low levels of partisan bias . . . .”).
5. See Grofman & King, supra note 4, at 8.
6. Id.
7. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1986).
8. Id. at 124.
9. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
10. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419–23 (2006).
11. Id. at 420.
12. Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. Id. at 468 n.9.
14. See id. at 467.
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criterion of symmetry as a test” and remarked that “[i]nterest in exploring this
notion is evident.”15
The appeal of the partisan fairness approach is that it captures the primary
harm that is caused by gerrymandering. A district plan is typically considered a
gerrymander in favor of a party precisely because the plan enables the party to
convert votes to seats more efficiently than its opponent. A party is typically
deemed the victim of gerrymandering precisely because its popular support does
not translate into legislative strength with the same ease as its adversary’s. The
partisan fairness approach is also attractive because it focuses on a jurisdiction as a
whole, not on the shape or composition of individual districts. There are many
innocent explanations for districts’ appearance and makeup, so it is preferable to
concentrate on the overall rather than the local picture. The approach’s final
advantage is that it lends itself easily to quantification. As I discuss in Part II,
metrics such as partisan bias and the efficiency differential reveal how fair or
unfair a plan is to the major parties.
On the other hand, a problem with the partisan fairness approach is that
unequal treatment of the parties is often the result of a jurisdiction’s underlying
political geography, not a deliberate attempt to gerrymander. For example, if
Democrats tend to live in urban areas that are overwhelmingly Democratic, while
Republicans live mostly in suburbs and exurbs that are more evenly divided, then
any plan that respects subdivision boundaries will be biased in a Republican
direction.16 Unequal partisan effect is not a sure sign of illicit partisan intent. Another
issue with the approach is that it overlooks all of the values implicated by
redistricting other than the treatment of the parties in terms of vote-to-seat
conversion. To name a few, voter participation, minority influence, and the quality
of representation all are influenced by how districts are drawn, but all are paid no
heed by the approach. A final, more technical concern is that the usual metrics of
partisan fairness are somewhat unreliable. Partisan bias and efficiency differential
scores fluctuate from election to election, especially when a jurisdiction has few
districts, and the former measure relies upon the problematic assumption of
uniform partisan swing.17
15. Id. at 483 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16. See Jonathan Rodden, The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences, 13 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 321, 332 (2010) (noting that redistricting biases against leftist parties have existed in many
countries “going back to the turn of the century”); Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Using Legislative
Districting Simulations to Measure Electoral Bias in Legislatures 24 (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.stanford
.edu/~jrodden/wp/Chen%20and%20Rodden%20-%20Midwest%20paper.pdf (finding that district
plans of most U.S. states containing major cities are biased in the Republican direction).
17. The uniform swing assumption stipulates that parties’ district-specific vote shares change (or
“swing”) by the same margin as their statewide vote shares. For example, if the Democrats received
45% of the vote in a state, and a researcher wanted to know how many seats they would have won if
they had received 50%, the researcher would simply add 5% to the actual Democratic vote share in
each district. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1903, 1963–64
(2012). The assumption usually generates accurate seat share estimates, but is still considered “neither
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Despite these difficulties, at least sixteen jurisdictions—South Australia and
fifteen U.S. states—have used partisan fairness as a criterion to design the district
plans for at least 193 elections. Whether the criterion has actually achieved its aim
of making plans more symmetric in their treatment of the major parties has never
previously been investigated.18 It is to this important question that I turn in Part
II.
B. Competitiveness
The other consequentialist approach to redistricting to emerge in recent
years prizes competitiveness rather than partisan fairness. It contends that districts
in a jurisdiction should be drawn so that they are as competitive as is reasonably
possible. Not all districts should be made competitive, because some geographic
regions are highly uncompetitive and their integrity usually should be respected.19
But what is clearly unacceptable is the deliberate suppression of the competition
that would arise in a jurisdiction if district lines were drawn pursuant to
conventional redistricting criteria. As Issacharoff writes, “The question is . . .
whether districts may be rigged so as to diminish or eliminate competition that
would otherwise emerge from redistricting not controlled by incumbent partisan
power.”20
The normative reason to prioritize competitiveness so highly is that it
promotes the realization of several important democratic values. First, individual
politicians are more accountable to voters when districts are competitive. Closer
races make it easier for voters to oust politicians from office when they
disapprove of their record.21 Second, competitiveness increases the responsiveness
theoretically nor empirically satisfying” by certain political scientists. Simon Jackman, Measuring
Electoral Bias: Australia, 1949–93, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 319, 335 (1994).
18. To be more precise, this issue has never been investigated with respect to American
jurisdictions. Jenni Newton-Farrelly has written an illuminating series of articles on the South
Australian case, finding that the state’s partisan fairness requirement has generally performed well. See
Jenni Newton-Farrelly, From Gerry-Built to Purpose-Built: Drawing Electoral Boundaries for Unbiased Election
Outcomes, 45 REPRESENTATION 471, 479–80 (2009) [hereinafter Newton-Farrelly, Gerry-Built]; Jenni
Newton-Farrelly, From Blindfolds to Naked Emperors: Swing and Fair Electoral Boundaries, SWINBURNE
RES. BANK (Sept. 27, 2010), http://researchbank.swinburne.edu.au/vital/access/manager/
Repository/swin:19065 [hereinafter Newton-Farrelly, Blindfolds]; Jenni Newton-Farrelly, Wrong Winner
Election Outcomes in South Australia: Bias, Minor Parties and Non-Uniform Swings, SWINBURNE RES. BANK
2–3 (2010), http://researchbank.swinburne.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/swin:17518
[hereinafter Newton-Farrelly, Wrong Winner].
19. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political
Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 574 (2004) (“Nor is our claim that an electoral system requires
every district to be competitive. There will always be Berkeley and Orange County . . . .”); Richard H.
Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 261 (2006) (“To ensure that all
elections are competitive is, of course, impossible.”).
20. Samuel Issacharoff, Surreply, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 692 (2002).
21. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 616
(2002) (“[A]ccountability is a central feature of democratic legitimacy . . . .”); Michael P. McDonald &
John Samples, The Marketplace of Democracy: Normative and Empirical Issues, in THE MARKETPLACE OF
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of the electoral system as a whole. Shifts in the electorate’s views have a greater
impact on the composition of the legislature when more districts are competitive
(and thus can swing from one party to another).22 Lastly, competitiveness is linked
to voter participation. Voters learn more about candidates and are more likely to
turn out at the polls when there is some uncertainty about races’ outcomes.23
Unlike the partisan fairness approach, the competitiveness approach has
never been endorsed by the Supreme Court. In Vieth, Justice Souter did refer to
the “analogy to antitrust,” a domain in which anticompetitive practices are
prohibited, as “an intriguing one that may prove fruitful.”24 However, he then
added that he did “not embrace [the analogy] at this point out of caution about a
wholesale conceptual transfer from economics to politics.”25 Similarly, Justice
Stevens observed in LULAC that uncompetitive races can lead to lower voter
turnout and higher legislative polarization.26 But his opinion focused on partisan
intent rather than lack of competition, and he did not suggest that a plan could be
invalidated for the latter reason.27 And in the 1973 decision of Gaffney v. Cummings,
the Court actually approved a Connecticut plan that created 130 safe state house
districts and only 20 competitive districts.28 The Court was untroubled by the
plan’s reduction of competition in order to produce a “proportionate number of
Democratic and Republican legislative seats.”29
The appeal of the competitiveness approach stems from the democratic
values that it aims to realize. Accountability, responsiveness, and participation all
are widely seen as key elements of a vibrant democracy—and all are improved by
increases in district-level competitiveness.30 The approach is also attractive
because it captures another harm that is sometimes thought to be caused by
gerrymandering: the creation of safe districts that insulate politicians (particularly
DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 1,5 (Michael P. McDonald &
John Samples eds., 2006) (“[ D]emocratic theorists value electoral competition as a way to ensure that
representatives are accountable to voters.”).
22. See Gelman & King, supra note 4, at 544 (“Scholars of American politics almost uniformly
take the normative position that higher values of responsiveness indicate a healthier democracy.”);
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50
STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998) (“Only through an appropriately competitive partisan environment can
. . . policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens.”).
23. See Pildes, supra note 19, at 260 (“[ I]t is well documented that competitive elections
. . . increase voter turnout . . . .”).
24. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 350 n.5 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (plurality opinion).
25. Id.
26. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 471 n.10 (2006)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. See id. at 456–62.
28. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 738 n.4 (1973).
29. Id. at 738; see also Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 612–17 (criticizing Gaffney on this basis).
30. See Nathaniel Persily, The Place of Competition in American Election Law, in THE
MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note
21, at 171, 173 (“[ P]olitical competition is primarily a means to other ends: namely, greater
accountability, responsiveness . . . and participation in government.”).
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incumbents) from any real risk of losing their seats. This is not the primary harm
that is associated with gerrymandering (that would be partisan unfairness), but it is
an important consideration nonetheless.31 The approach’s final advantage is that it
too lends itself to quantification. Metrics such as average margin of victory, share
of competitive seats, and electoral responsiveness indicate both how competitive
individual districts are and how responsive a jurisdiction’s electoral system is as a
whole.
Conversely, a problem with the competitiveness approach is that it ignores
the concept—the unequal treatment of the parties in terms of vote-to-seat
conversion—that lies at the heart of the usual definition of gerrymandering.32
That certain districts are uncompetitive, or that a plan in its entirety is
nonresponsive, is certainly very interesting, but it is not typically thought to be
evidence that a gerrymander has been enacted. Another issue with the approach is
that competitiveness is not in fact an unalloyed good. Closer races result in more
dissatisfied voters who would have preferred a different outcome,33 and very high
responsiveness means that small changes in voter sentiment produce very large
changes in legislative composition.34 Finally, like the partisan fairness approach,
the competitiveness approach neglects values such as minority influence and the
quality of representation, and its quantitative metrics are relatively volatile.35
These difficulties have not stopped a substantial number of jurisdictions—
nine U.S. states in 103 elections—from using competitiveness as a criterion to
design their district plans. Whether the criterion has actually accomplished its goal
of making elections more competitive is a question that only recently has begun to
be considered. One study found that Arizona’s adoption of a competitiveness
criterion in 2000 did not make its elections any more competitive.36 Another study
determined that “political” requirements, including both competitiveness criteria
and rules on incumbent protection, reduced the vote shares received by
incumbents nationwide.37 No work to date has examined the consequences of only
31. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 471 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the ways in which “[s]afe seats may harm the democratic process”).
32. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (plurality opinion) (“The term ‘political
gerrymander’ has been defined as ‘[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts
. . . to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.’”).
33. See Thomas L. Brunell, Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive Districts Eliminates
Gerrymanders, Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes Toward Congress, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 77,
77–81 (2006) (arguing against competitive districts for this reason).
34. See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence
to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 668 (2002) (noting that if there are too
many competitive districts in a jurisdiction, then “the slightest shift in voter preferences would lead to
a landslide victory for one of the parties”).
35. See supra text accompanying note 17.
36. See Barbara Norrander & Jay Wendland, Redistricting in Arizona, in REAPPORTIONMENT
AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 177, 191 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
37. See Richard Forgette & Glenn Platt, Redistricting Principles and Incumbency Protection in the U.S.
Congress, 24 POL. GEOGRAPHY 934, 939–46 (2005); see also Richard Forgette et al., Do Redistricting
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competitiveness criteria in all of the jurisdictions that have employed them. The
next Part offers precisely such an examination.
II. CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITERIA IN PRACTICE
Now that the two consequentialist approaches to redistricting have been
introduced, it is possible to turn to the question that motivates this Article: What
are the actual consequences of consequentialist criteria? Do they in fact achieve
their aims of greater partisan fairness and increased competitiveness? I begin this
Part by explaining my methodology, and I then present the results of my analysis
with respect to both partisan fairness (for South Australia, the U.S. House of
Representatives, and American state legislatures) and competitiveness (for the U.S.
House and state legislatures). In a nutshell, my principal finding is that
consequentialist criteria have not been very successful at bringing about their
intended consequences, though there is plenty more to the story.
A. Methodology
To begin with, I compiled the results of all federal and state elections held in
Australia since 1990, as well as South Australian state election results since 1950.38
South Australia adopted its partisan fairness requirement in 1991,39 so there was
little reason to gather comprehensive data from prior to this date. I also compiled
all American congressional and state legislative election results since 1966,40 the

Principles and Practices Affect U.S. State Legislative Electoral Competition?, 9 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 151, 155
(2009) [hereinafter, Forgette et al., Do Principles?] (referring to states that use competitiveness criteria
but only actually considering states with incumbency protection rules in analysis); Richard Forgette et
al., The Un-Principled Politics of State Legislative and Congressional Redistricting 7 (Sept. 2–5, 2005)
(unpublished paper) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review) [hereinafter Forgette et al., Un-Principled
Politics] (same); cf. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
800–01 (2013) (summarizing inconclusive literature on implications of redistricting institutions for
competitiveness).
38. Federal election results are available at Download Official Election Statistics, AUSTRALIAN
ELECTORAL COMMISSION, http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/Federal_Elections/Stats_CDRom.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2013). Recent state election results are available at Election Archive, ABC NEWS,
http://www.abc.net.au/elections/archive (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). Jenni Newton-Farrelly shared
with me historical South Australian election results compiled by Colin Hughes, and I am very grateful
for her help. I only analyzed Australia’s five largest states (New South Wales, Queensland, South
Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia), and I only used Western Australia’s 2008 state election
because prior to this date it did not abide by the one-person, one-vote rule.
39. See S. AUSTL. STATE ELECTORAL OFFICE, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL BOUNDARY
REDISTRIBUTIONS: 1851–2003, at 4, 7 (2006).
40. Congressional election results are available at Election Information: Election Statistics, OFF.
CLERK U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/
index.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2013), and also, in a more usable format, in a database that Gary
Jacobson shared with me. Jacobson’s database contains presidential election results aggregated by
congressional district as well. I conducted all of my congressional analysis using this data too, but my
findings were not as easily interpretable. Not surprisingly, variables pertaining to congressional races
predict congressional results more accurately than aggregated presidential results. For state legislative
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year the one-person, one-vote rule was first enforced in almost all elections.41 The
first consequentialist criteria were not implemented until 1972, but the climax of
the reapportionment revolution seemed like a better starting point for my study
than the unheralded innovations of a handful of states.
Next, I tried to identify all states that have ever employed consequentialist
criteria in the modern era, as well as the years of the elections in which the criteria
were used. In some cases, this task was relatively straightforward. For example, the
state laws of Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, and Washington currently include
partisan fairness or competitiveness requirements, and it was not hard to
determine when these requirements were enacted.42 In many cases, however,
consequentialist criteria were not memorialized in state laws, but rather were
invoked on an ad hoc basis by legislatures, commissions, or courts. I found these
cases by searching the relevant case law, examining state redistricting websites, and
consulting historical resources on redistricting. I cannot be certain that I have
located all cases in which consequentialist criteria were used, but I am reasonably
confident that I have discovered the vast majority of them. Notably, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, the best-informed organization about
redistricting around the country, could not identify any cases that I have missed.43
Figures 1 and 2 list the states (and institutions within them) that have
employed consequentialist criteria, the levels and years of the elections in which
they did so, and the key language that they have issued. Consequentialist criteria
have been used for about twice as many state legislative elections as congressional
elections. They have been used about twice as often in the last two full
redistricting cycles (the 1990s and 2000s) as in the two before them (the 1970s and
1980s). And they have been used about twice as often by courts as by legislatures
and commissions put together. The most common partisan fairness formulations
include assertions that the concept was considered in drawing districts, bans on

election results, I relied entirely on a comprehensive database that Carl Klarner has recently
assembled. The congressional data includes the results of the 2012 elections, while the state legislative
data is only available through 2010. Presidential election results aggregated by state legislative district
are not available.
41. See Leroy Hardy et al., Introduction to REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS: THE HISTORY OF
REDISTRICTING IN THE 50 STATES 17, 19 (Leroy Hardy et al. eds., 1981) (“By 1966, legislatures in 46
of the 50 states had brought their apportionments into compliance with the new judicial standards of
population equality.”).
42. See infra notes 48, 49, 60, 67.
43. Importantly, I do not include in my study provisions that bar district plans from being
drawn with the intent to help or harm a party or candidate. California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington use such provisions, but they are not consequentialist
since they do not aim to produce election results that are fair to the major parties. It is also possible
that redistricting authorities have employed consequentialist criteria without ever stating in writing
that they did so. I doubt there are many such cases but I cannot be sure. Lastly, the fact that many
consequentialist criteria have been used without being formally memorialized actually improves the
accuracy of my empirical analysis. It means that the criteria were not adopted as components of
broader electoral reforms, thus allaying concerns about endogeneity and omitted variables.
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plans that unduly favor a party, requirements of approximate seat-to-vote
proportionality, and requirements that whichever party wins a majority of votes
also should win a majority of seats. The most common competitiveness
formulations either state that the concept was taken into account or declare that
larger numbers of competitive districts were created.
Figure 1: Jurisdictions Using Partisan Fairness Criteria
Jurisdiction

Level

Elections Used

Institution

Key Language

South
Australia44

State

1993–2010

Legislature

“[I]f candidates of a particular
group attract more than 50 per cent
of the popular vote . . . they will be
elected in sufficient numbers to
enable a government to be
formed”

California45

Federal
& state

1974–1980

Court

Plans are not “politically unfair”
and will not “produce a manifestly
unfair political result”

Colorado46

Federal

2002–2010

Court

“Finally, we check our plan against
the test of general partisan
outcome”

Connecticut47

State

1972–1980

Legislature

“[W]hichever party carried the
state should carry a majority of . . .
seats proportional to the statewide
party majority”

Delaware48

State

1972–2012

Legislature

Plans shall “[n]ot be created so as
to unduly favor any . . . political
party”

Hawaii49

Federal
& state

1972–2012

Legislature

“No district shall be so drawn as to
unduly favor a . . . political faction”

Illinois50

Federal

1992–2000

Court

Plan is “likely to yield a distribution
of seats across party lines that
mirrors the statewide partisan
makeup of the voting citizenry”

Maine51

Federal
& state

1994–2000

Court

Plan “attempted to remove some
of the partisanship that had
inadvertently been incorporated in
our preliminary plan”

44. Constitution Act 1934 (SA) pt 5 div 2 s 83 (Austl.).
45. Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 38 (Cal. 1973).
46. Avalos v. Davidson, No. 01 CV 2897, 2002 WL 1895406, at *8 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2002).
47. Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F. Supp. 139, 147 (D. Conn. 1972), rev’d, Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735 (1973).
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804(4) (2002).
49. HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2(b)(1) (2012).
50. Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
51. In re 1993 Reapportionment, No. SJC-229, slip op. at 1 (Me. 1993).
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Figure 1 (continued)
Jurisdiction

Level

Elections Used

Institution

Key Language

Michigan52

Federal

1992–2000

Court

Plan is “likely to result in a
congressional delegation . . . that is
roughly proportionate to the
relative strength of the political
parties”

Mississippi53

Federal

1992–2000

Legislature

“The redistricting plan should
avoid a political gerrymander”

New Jersey54

Federal
& state

1982–2012

Commission

Plan “sought to achieve statewide
partisan fairness so that the party
that receives a majority of the total
statewide vote in a legislative
election will obtain a majority in
the legislature”

New Mexico55

Federal
& state

2002–2012

Court

Plan “avoid[ed], to the extent
possible, partisan bias”

New York56

Federal

1992–2000

Court

Plan included “political fairness” as
criterion

Texas57

Federal

2002

Court

Plan is “likely to produce a
congressional delegation roughly
proportional to the party voting
breakdown across the state”

Virginia58

State

1992–2000

Legislature

Plan included “political fairness” as
criterion

Wisconsin59

State

1992–2000

Court

Plan “creates the least perturbation
in the political balance of the state”
and is “least partisan” proposal

52.
53.

Good v. Austin, 800 F. Supp. 557, 566 (E. & W.D. Mich. 1992).
MISS. STANDING JOINT CONG. REDISTRICTING COMM., CRITERIA FOR CONG.
REDISTRICTING 3 (1991).
54. Robertson v. Bartels, 148 F. Supp. 2d 443, 459 (D.N.J. 2001); see also Brady v. N.J.
Redistricting Comm’n, 622 A.2d 843, 855 (N.J. 1992); Gonzalez v. State Apportionment Comm’n, 53
A.3d 1230, 1236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012); DONALD E. STOKES, LEGISLATIVE
REDISTRICTING BY THE NEW JERSEY PLAN 7–17 (1993).
55. Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66, 79 (N.M. 2012); see also Court’s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law Concerning State House of Representatives Redistricting at 10, Jepsen v. VigilGiron, No. D0101-CV-2001-02177 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://www.
senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/NM_D0101-CV-2001-02177_01-2402.pdf; Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5, Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D0101-CV2001-02177 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Jan. 2, 2002), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments
/scr/redist/redsum2000/NM_D0101_CV_2001_02177_01-02-02.pdf.
56. Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 102–04 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
57. Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 36403750, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2001).
58. Jamerson v. Womack, 26 Va. Cir. 145, 145 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1991).
59. Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 871 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (per curiam).
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Figure 2: Jurisdictions Using Competitiveness Criteria
Jurisdiction

Level

Elections Used

Institution

Key Language

Arizona60

Federal
& state

2002–2012

Commission

“To the extent practicable,
competitive districts should be
favored . . .”

California61

Federal
& state

1974–1980

Court

Plan will “result in fewer ‘safe
seats’ and more ‘competitive
seats’”

Colorado62

Federal
& state

1992–2012

Commission
& court

Plan “considered
competitiveness as an important
factor”

Florida63

Federal

1992–2000

Court

Plan “considered . . . party
competitiveness”

New Jersey64

State

1982–2012

Commission

Plan “ensur[ed] that some seats
were competitive so that the
composition of the Legislature
would be responsive to shifts in
votes from one party to the
other”

New Mexico65

Federal
& state

2002–2010

Court

Plan “promote[s] . . . political
competition”

North
Carolina66

Federal

2012

Legislature

Plan had as goal “to create more
competitive Congressional
districts”

60. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F).
61. Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 38 (Cal. 1973).
62. Hall v. Moreno, 270 P.3d 961, 973 (Colo. 2012); see also Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d
1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 1996); Avalos v. Davidson, No. 01CV2897, 2002 WL 1895406, at *7 (D. Colo.
Jan. 25, 2002).
63. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1084–85 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
64. Robertson v. Bartels, 148 F. Supp. 2d 443, 455 (D.N.J. 2001); see also Gonzalez v. State
Apportionment Comm’n, 53 A.3d 1230, 1236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012); STOKES, supra note
54, at 7–17.
65. Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Concerning State House of
Representatives Redistricting at 10, Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D0101-CV-2001-02177 (N.M. 1st Jud.
Dist. Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum
2000/NM_D0101-CV-2001-02177_01-24-02.pdf; see also Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 5, Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D0101-CV-2001-02177 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Jan. 2, 2002),
available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/NM_D0101_CV
_2001_02177_01-02-02.pdf.
66. Bob Rucho & David Lewis, Joint Statement of Sen. Bob Rucho and Rep. David Lewis
Regarding the Release of Rucho-Lewis Congress, NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (July
19, 2011), http://www.ncleg.net/gis/download/referencedocs/2011/joint%20statement%20of
%20senator%20bob%20rucho%20and%20representative%20david%20lewis_7_19_11.pdf.
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Figure 2 (continued)
Jurisdiction

Level

Elections Used

Institution

Key Language

Washington67

Federal
& state

1992–2012

Commission

“The commission shall exercise
its powers to . . . encourage
electoral competition”

Wisconsin68

State

1984–1990

Legislature

Plan gave “due consideration to
the need for . . . competitive
legislative districts”

After compiling all the relevant election results and identifying all the
relevant cases, the next stage of my analysis was to calculate measures of partisan
fairness and competitiveness for each jurisdiction in each election year. My first
partisan fairness metric was partisan bias, that is, the divergence in the share of
seats that each party would win given the same share of the statewide vote.69 For
example, if Democrats would win 48% of a state’s seats with 50% of the state’s
vote (in which case Republicans would win 52% of the seats), then a district plan
would have a pro-Republican bias of 2%. As is customary, I calculated bias at the
point at which each party receives 50% of the vote,70 and I relied on the uniform
swing assumption.71 I also considered only the absolute value of bias because I
was interested in the metric’s magnitude rather than its orientation.
My second measure of partisan fairness was the efficiency differential, that is, the
gap between the parties’ respective “wasted” votes.72 All of the votes for a party’s
candidate are wasted if the candidate loses the election, while all of the votes
above the threshold for victory are wasted if the candidate wins. The party with
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090(5) (2013).
68. WIS. STAT. § 4.001(3) (repealed 2011).
69. See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and
Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 514, 536 (1994); Gelman & King, supra note 4, at 545;
Grofman & King, supra note 4, at 8.
70. See Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s
Congressional Redistricting, 52 J. POL. 1242, 1245 (1990); Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, The
Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U.S. Congressional Elections, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 812, 820 (1999);
Bruce E. Cain et al., Redistricting and Electoral Competitiveness in State Legislative Elections 2 (Apr.
13, 2007) (unpublished paper) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review).
71. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In addition, because certain states do not report
vote tallies when candidates run unopposed, I calculated statewide vote shares for the parties by
averaging all of their district-specific vote shares, not by using aggregate statewide vote tallies.
However, the two methods of calculating statewide vote shares produce very similar results.
72. See Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems 15–18 (Jan.
2, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195785 (introducing this measure
but calling it “relative wasted votes”). Because of the occasional inaccuracy (or unavailability) of
district-specific vote tallies, see supra text accompanying note 71, I calculated the efficiency differential
using district-specific vote shares, which are more reliable. Both methods again produce very similar
results.
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fewer wasted votes in a state is said to have an efficiency advantage over its
opponent. Unlike partisan bias, the efficiency differential is calculated using
unadjusted election results rather than the results of a hypothetical fifty-fifty
election. For this reason, the metric does not require use of the uniform swing
assumption—there are no vote tallies that need to be swung.73 As with partisan
bias, I considered only the absolute value of the efficiency differential. In
combination, partisan bias and the efficiency differential accurately capture the
partisan fairness of an election. The metrics are well suited to assessing the
implications of partisan fairness criteria.
My first measure of competitiveness was the average margin of victory in a
jurisdiction, that is, the average difference in vote shares between the winning and
losing candidates.74 Uncontested races, which are common at both the
congressional and state legislative levels, have a margin of victory of 100%. My
second metric was the share of competitive seats in a state, that is, the proportion of
races decided by less than a twenty-point margin.75 Narrower competitive bands
(such as ten points) are sometimes used instead,76 but given the general lack of
competitiveness in American elections, they are a bit too stringent for my
purposes.
My final metric was electoral responsiveness, that is, the rate at which a party
gains or loses seats given changes in its statewide vote share.77 For instance, if
Democrats would win ten percent more seats if they received five percent more of
the statewide vote, then a plan would have a responsiveness of two. Like partisan
bias, responsiveness relies on the uniform swing assumption and can be calculated
either at the hypothetical fifty-fifty point or using an election’s actual results. I
chose to compute it using actual results in order to make the resulting scores
easier to interpret. In combination, average margin of victory and share of

73. See McGhee, supra note 72, at 6, 22.
74. See Forgette et al., Do Principles?, supra note 37, at 159; Norrander & Wendland, supra note
36, at 184; Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western United States, U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 637, 662–63 (2013).
75. See Thomas L. Brunell & Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting on District
Homogeneity, Political Competition, and Political Extremism in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1962 to 2006, in
DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 117, 121 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2008); Jamie L. Carson
& Michael H. Crespin, The Effect of State Redistricting Methods on Electoral Competition in United States House
of Representatives Races, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 455, 460 (2004); Richard G. Niemi et al., Competition in
State Legislative Elections, 1992–2002, in THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL
COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 21, at 53, 65.
76. See James B. Cottrill, The Effects of Non-Legislative Approaches to Redistricting on Competition in
Congressional Elections, 44 POLITY 32, 36 (2012); Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California:
An Evaluation of the Citizens Commission Final Plans, 4 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 16–17 (2012), available at
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/cjpp.2012.4.issue-1/1944-4370.1197/1944-4370.1197.xml?format
=INT; Seth E. Masket et. al., The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won’t Affect
Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It, 45 POL. SCI. & POL. 39, 41 (2012).
77. See Gelman & King, supra note 4, at 542, 544; Grofman & King, supra note 4, at 9;
McGhee, supra note 72, at 5.
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competitive seats capture two important aspects of competitiveness, while
electoral responsiveness is a direct measure of a crucial value that competition is
meant to realize.78 In tandem, the three metrics are nicely tailored to evaluating the
effects of competitiveness requirements.
B. Partisan Fairness
1. South Australia
I begin my examination of consequentialist criteria with South Australia,
which since 1991 has employed the most explicit and entrenched partisan fairness
requirement in the world: “[I]f candidates of a particular group attract more than
50 per cent of the popular vote . . . they will be elected in sufficient numbers to
enable a government to be formed.”79 This requirement is ensconced in South
Australia’s constitution, it is listed before all other criteria, it has been used to
design five separate district plans, and it has been the subject of extensive research
and analysis by the state’s redistricting commission.80 If any partisan fairness
criterion could be expected to succeed, it is this one.
As Figure 3 indicates, South Australia has enjoyed lower levels of partisan
bias and smaller efficiency differentials than other Australian jurisdictions over the
1990–2010 period. Its partisan bias averaged 3.6% in this era, compared to 4.5%
for other state elections and 5.1% for federal elections. Its efficiency differential
averaged 4.3%, compared to 5.5% for other state elections and 8.2% for federal
elections. The Australian states included in my study all have substantial numbers
of state and federal districts and rely on redistricting commissions that use almost
exactly the same criteria.81 The existence of a partisan fairness requirement in
South Australia is the most distinctive feature of this legal landscape—and, at first
glance, it appears to have precisely its desired consequences.

78. See supra note 22.
79. Constitution Act 1934 (SA) pt 5 div 2 s 83 (Austl.).
80. See supra note 18; see also S. AUSTL. ELECTORAL DISTS. BOUNDARIES COMM’N, REPORT
6–16 (2007), available at http://www.ecsa.sa.gov.au/apps/uploadedFiles/news/416/Final_report__1_Front_Section.pdf; S. AUSTL. ELECTORAL DISTS. BOUNDARIES COMM’N, REPORT 12–18 (2003),
available at http://www.ecsa.sa.gov.au/apps/uploadedFiles/news/205/Report.pdf.
81. See supra note 38 (specifying states used in analysis).
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Figure 3: Australian Partisan Bias Scores and Efficiency Differentials, 1990–2010
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
South Australia
Partisan bias

Other states
Federal elections
Efficiency differential

However, the differences in partisan bias and the efficiency differential
between South Australia and other Australian jurisdictions do not rise to the level
of statistical significance.82 Nor, when I carry out regressions with controls added
for the year, the level of the election (state or federal), the number of districts in a
state, and the Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) share of the statewide vote, does the
presence of a partisan fairness requirement remain a significant predictor of
partisan bias or the efficiency differential.83 Interestingly, no variable seems to
predict partisan bias with any particular accuracy, perhaps because its levels are
uniformly low thanks to the use of independent redistricting commissions
throughout Australia. However, the ALP’s statewide vote share is linked
negatively to the efficiency differential, perhaps because ALP supporters are
concentrated in urban areas, and so if the ALP’s vote share is low it is likely to
receive particularly few seats (and to waste particularly many votes).84 Also of
note, the presence of a partisan fairness requirement is statistically significant at

82. A two-sample t-test for partisan bias yields t = 0.76 and p = 0.23. A two-sample t-test for
the efficiency differential yields t = 1.12 and p = 0.13.
83. See infra Table 1. All of the regressions that I ran for this Article used ordinary least
squares. All of the regressions also used the election year (i.e., an election by a given state in a given
year) as the basic unit of analysis. Since the presence of a partisan fairness requirement was not
statistically significant even with these few controls included, I did not attempt to compile the full set
of controls that I used for the U.S. models. In any case, redistricting criteria and the institutions
responsible for redistricting do not vary appreciably from state to state in Australia.
84. See supra note 16 (noting the tendency of single-member district plans to disadvantage
leftist parties).
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the more generous ten percent level, indicating that it is likely having some
downward influence on the efficiency differential.85
Longitudinal analysis further confirms that South Australia’s partisan fairness
requirement has not been very impactful. For much of the postwar era,
malapportionment and gerrymandering were rampant in the state; as Figure 4
displays, bias averaged 9.0% over the ten elections between 1950 and 1975.86 In
1975, the state embraced the one-person, one-vote rule and instituted an
independent redistricting commission.87 Dramatic drops followed in both partisan
bias (9.0% to 3.6%) and the efficiency differential (5.7% to 2.7%) over the next
five elections. However, the 1991 adoption of the partisan fairness requirement
did not produce any further benefits. Partisan bias remained static over the next
five elections (3.6% to 3.6%), while the efficiency differential actually increased
somewhat (2.7% to 4.3%). The upshot is that equally sized districts and an
independent commission improved partisan fairness in South Australia, but an
actual partisan fairness requirement did not. All of South Australia’s gains came
after its first round of redistricting reform—but before its second.
Figure 4: South Australian Partisan Bias Scores
and Efficiency Differentials, 1950–2010
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
1950-1975
Partisan bias

1977-1989
1993-2010
Efficiency differential

85. Its coefficient is substantial as well; the presence of a partisan fairness requirement reduces
the efficiency differential by 5.6%. However, this result ceases to hold when fixed effects for the state
and year are included in the model.
86. Because I wanted the bias scores to reflect the impact of South Australia’s pre-1975
malapportionment, I calculated statewide vote shares here using aggregate vote tallies, not by
averaging the parties’ district-specific vote shares. For the same reason, I calculated the efficiency
differentials using district-specific vote tallies, not vote shares. See supra notes 71–72 and
accompanying text.
87. See S. AUSTL. STATE ELECTORAL OFFICE, supra note 39, at 7. The first election conducted
under the new regime was in 1977.
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2. U.S. House of Representatives
I turn next to the U.S. House of Representatives, where partisan fairness
requirements have been employed by eleven states in sixty elections since 1966.
The decisions to use these requirements typically have been made by courts that
have found themselves responsible for drawing district lines. Legislatures and
commissions rarely have opted to take partisan fairness into account.88
As Figure 5’s density curves indicate, both partisan bias and the efficiency
differential are lower in elections in which partisan fairness requirements are used.
Partisan bias averages 6.2% in elections with these criteria but 8.3% in elections
without them. Similarly, the efficiency differential averages 7.2% in elections with
these criteria but 10.2% in elections without them. Both of these differences are
statistically significant.89 The density curves also illustrate why partisan bias and the
efficiency differential are lower in elections with partisan fairness requirements. In
both cases, the right tail of the no-requirement distribution, containing elections
with particularly high partisan bias and efficiency differential scores, is absent from
the distribution of elections with the criteria. In other words, the presence of a
partisan fairness requirement seems to prevent the adoption of district plans that
are marked by extreme partisan biases or efficiency differentials.
Figure 5: Density Curves for U.S. House Elections, Partisan Bias Scores
and Efficiency Differentials, 1966–2012

As with the initial South Australian results, these findings appear positive at
first glance. Congressional elections with partisan fairness requirements indeed
treat the major parties more symmetrically than congressional elections without
them. Unfortunately, as with South Australia, the findings’ impressiveness
decreases when the data is subjected to more rigorous analysis. I regressed partisan
88. See supra Figure 1.
89. A two-sample t-test for partisan bias yields t = 2.83 and p = 0.004 . A two-sample t-test for
the efficiency differential yields t = 3.55 and p = 0.0005. I omit states with fewer than five
congressional districts from my analysis because partisan fairness metrics are too unreliable when the
number of districts is so small.
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bias and the efficiency differential against the presence of a partisan fairness
requirement as well as an array of controls that, according to the political science
literature, may have an effect on partisan fairness: other redistricting criteria, the
institution responsible for redistricting, Voting Rights Act (VRA) coverage,
whether the state government was unified or divided, the Democratic share of the
statewide vote, the number of districts in a state, the year of the election, and the
redistricting cycle of the election.90 The presence of a partisan fairness
requirement was statistically insignificant in the partisan bias model, and
significant only at the more generous ten percent level in the efficiency differential
model. The requirement’s presence therefore does not seem to be a major
determinant of partisan fairness once other relevant factors have been taken into
account.91
Which factors are major determinants of partisan fairness? Interestingly, in
the partisan bias model, no variable attained the customary five percent level of
significance, suggesting that bias in congressional elections (like bias in Australian
elections) is quite difficult to predict. However, the use of a court to design a
district plan was significant at the ten percent level. Unsurprisingly, partisan
gerrymanders are unlikely to emerge when judicial actors are responsible for
redistricting.92 In the efficiency differential model, the number of districts in a
state and the Democratic share of the statewide vote were both significant at the
usual level, and the presence of divided government almost reached this threshold.
A larger number of districts reduces the efficiency differential because it increases
the denominator for the calculation and lowers the metric’s volatility. The
Democratic vote share may be linked positively to the efficiency differential
because when Democrats perform well in a state they are likely to waste many of
their votes in dense urban areas.93 And the presence of divided government

90. See infra Table 2. I only considered elections in the 1990, 2000, and 2010 cycles, because
controls for earlier cycles were unavailable. Most of the controls vary by redistricting cycle, though the
Democratic share of the statewide vote and the year of the election vary by year, and VRA coverage
does not vary temporally at all. The reasons why the controls might be expected to have an effect on
partisan fairness are discussed below in my analyses of the regression results. My results are similar
when I use robust standard errors or cluster standard errors by state, for both these regressions and
the ones discussed below. These models thus are not reported in the appendix.
91. When fixed effects are added for the state and year, the presence of a partisan fairness
requirement loses its statistical significance (at any level) in the efficiency differential model as well.
92. When I further limited the universe of cases to states with at least ten congressional
districts, several variables attained statistical significance in the partisan bias model. Respect for
communities of interest and respect for prior district cores increased partisan bias, while incumbency
protection, divided government, commission usage, and court usage reduced it. Similarly, in the
efficiency differential model, respect for prior district cores and the Democratic share of the statewide
vote increased the differential, while divided government and commission usage reduced it. These
results are consistent with the findings of the state legislative models, which also use plans containing
relatively large numbers of districts. See infra Table 3.
93. It is unclear why the Democratic vote share is linked positively to the efficiency
differential, while the ALP vote share in Australia is linked negatively. See supra note 84 and
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inhibits partisan gerrymandering because both parties will almost never agree to a
district plan that disadvantages one of them.94
3. U.S. State Legislatures
American state legislative elections are the final set of races that I examined
for evidence of the effectiveness of partisan fairness requirements. Nine states
have employed such requirements in 128 state house and state senate elections
over the 1967–2010 period. Legislatures and courts each account for about half of
these cases; the only state-level commission to take partisan fairness into account
is New Jersey’s.95 For present purposes, the most notable difference between state
legislative and congressional elections is the larger number of districts in the
former. The average state legislative plan has sixty-six districts, compared to
thirteen in the congressional plans that I used in my analysis (and nine in all
congressional plans).96 The greater volume of state legislative districts makes
measures of both partisan fairness and competitiveness substantially more
trustworthy.
As Figure 6’s density curves display, both partisan bias and the efficiency
differential are lower in elections in which partisan fairness requirements are used.
Partisan bias averages 5.9% in elections with these criteria but 6.7% in elections
without them. Similarly, the efficiency differential averages 7.9% in elections with
these criteria but 9.9% in elections without them. Both of these differences are
statistically significant.97 These state legislative findings are very similar to the
congressional results presented above, and so too are the shapes of the density
curves. Once again, the right tails of the no-requirement distributions, containing
elections with particularly high partisan bias and efficiency differential scores, are
absent from the distributions of elections with the criteria. The effect is even more
pronounced here because the left sides of the distributions are nearly identical.
Partisan fairness requirements appear to alter the distributions of state legislative
plans only by slicing off their right tails.

accompanying text. Differences in the distributions of the leftist parties’ supporters presumably
account for this result.
94. In addition, the presence of a competitiveness requirement is significant at the ten percent
level in both models, though it is hard to know what to make of this result since the requirement’s
presence seems to increase partisan bias but reduce the efficiency differential. See infra Table 2.
95. See supra Figure 1.
96. I omit states with fewer than five congressional districts from my congressional regression
analysis. See supra note 89; infra note 104.
97. A two-sample t-test for partisan bias yields t = 1.88 and p = 0.031. A two-sample t-test for
the efficiency differential yields t = 3.35 and p = 0.0005. I omit states with multimember districts from
my analysis because partisan fairness metrics cannot easily be calculated for plans that use such
districts.
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Figure 6: Density Curves for U.S. State Legislative Elections,
Partisan Bias Scores and Efficiency Differentials, 1967–2010

Unfortunately, as with the congressional results, this promising picture fades
once controls are added for other relevant factors. Controlling for the same
variables as before, the presence of a partisan fairness requirement is not a
statistically significant predictor of either partisan bias or the efficiency
differential.98 The encouraging descriptive statistics and density curves are
therefore misleading. Partisan fairness requirements in fact do little to improve the
partisan symmetry of state legislative elections.
Some of the factors that do influence partisan symmetry in state legislative
elections are familiar from the congressional analysis. Once again, the number of
districts in a state and the use of a court to design a district plan have a significant
downward impact on both measures of partisan fairness, while the Democratic
share of the statewide vote has a significant upward impact. But, unlike in the
congressional analysis, the use of a commission to draw district lines is now a
significant predictor of the efficiency differential. As one might expect, there is
less of an efficiency gap between the parties when an outside body is responsible
for redistricting.99 Also notable are the effects of various common line-drawing
criteria. Respect for political subdivisions is linked to higher partisan bias, likely
because Democrats end up overconcentrated when the boundaries of urban areas
are carefully followed.100 Compactness is linked to higher efficiency differentials,
probably because aesthetically appealing districts also tend to pack Democrats.101
And the protection of incumbents is linked to lower partisan bias, since when
both parties’ elected officials are insulated from competition it is difficult to
simultaneously enact a partisan gerrymander.102
98. See infra Table 3.
99. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 37, at 799–800 (summarizing literature finding that use of
commissions increases partisan fairness).
100. See supra note 16.
101. See Chen & Rodden, supra note 16, at 2, 20.
102. In addition, respect for prior district cores is linked to higher partisan bias, perhaps
because the requirement tends to freeze in place existing partisan gerrymanders. And coverage by
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C. Competitiveness
1. U.S. House of Representatives
Competitiveness requirements are the other kind of consequentialist criteria,
and they have been employed at the congressional level by seven states in thirtyeight elections. Courts are the institutions that most often have decided to impose
these requirements, though they also have been applied by commissions and, on
one occasion, a legislature. Most of the states that have used the requirements are
located in the western part of the country.103
Like partisan fairness criteria, competitiveness requirements appear at first to
have produced their desired consequences. The average margin of victory is lower
in elections with them than in elections without them (32.0% versus 40.1%); the
proportion of races decided by less than twenty points is higher (37.6% versus
28.2%); and the level of electoral responsiveness is higher as well (1.85 versus
1.44). All of these differences are statistically significant, though only at the ten
percent level in the case of responsiveness.104 The density curves displayed in
Figure 7 are less illuminating than the ones shown earlier, due to the relatively
small number of congressional elections with competitiveness requirements, but
they also tend to confirm this rosy picture. The average-margin-of-victory curve
for elections with the criteria is clearly to the left of the curve for elections without
them, while the share-of-competitive-districts curve for elections with the criteria
is clearly to the right of the curve for elections without them.105

section 5 of the VRA is linked to lower efficiency differentials, either because the provision prevents
optimal Republican gerrymanders from being enacted, see Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden,
Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 573–74 (2011), or because
Democrats are more efficiently distributed in the southern states covered by section 5, see Chen &
Rodden, supra note 16, at 30–31.
103. See supra Figure 2.
104. A two-sample t-test for average margin of victory yields t = 3.37 and p = 0.0009. A twosample t-test for the share of districts decided by less than twenty points yields t = -2.57 and p =
0.0074. And a two-sample t-test for electoral responsiveness yields t = 1.50 and p = 0.071. As
before, I omit states with fewer than five congressional districts from my analysis because
competitiveness metrics are too unreliable when the number of districts is so small. See supra note 89.
105. On the other hand, the contrasts between the two electoral responsiveness distributions
are not readily apparent. This is unsurprising since the difference between the two distributions’
means is significant only at the more generous ten percent level. See supra note 104 and accompanying
text.
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Figure 7: Density Curves for U.S. House Elections, Average Margin of Victory,
Share of Competitive Districts, and Electoral Responsiveness, 1966–2012

Unfortunately, like the partisan fairness findings discussed above, these
results evaporate when controls are added for other factors that the political
science literature suggests are relevant. I regressed all three competitiveness
metrics against the presence of a competitiveness requirement as well as controls
for other redistricting criteria, the institution responsible for redistricting, VRA
coverage, whether the state government was unified or divided, the Democratic
share of the statewide vote, the number of districts in a state, the year of the
election, and the redistricting cycle of the election.106 In none of these models
does the presence of a competitiveness requirement attain statistical significance at
any level. In other words, efforts by line drawers to make congressional elections
more competitive do not in fact result in meaningful improvements in
competition.
One factor that does have a meaningful impact on all three measures of
competitiveness is the use of a commission to draw district lines. Commissiondrawn plans boast lower margins of victory, higher shares of competitive districts,
and higher levels of responsiveness, presumably because their authors have no

106. See infra Table 4. As before, I only considered elections in the 1990, 2000, and 2010
cycles, because controls for earlier cycles were unavailable. See supra note 90. Unsurprisingly, the
presence of a competitiveness requirement also fails to attain statistical significance when fixed effects
are added for the state and year.
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reason to prioritize the protection of incumbents.107 Respect for political
subdivisions also has a pro-competitive effect in all three models, probably
because challengers are better able to convey their messages to voters in districts
that are congruent with towns or counties.108 On the other hand, VRA coverage
increases the average margin of victory and decreases both the share of
competitive districts and responsiveness. Both the majority-minority districts
required by the VRA and the “bleached” districts adjacent to them are particularly
safe for incumbents. The presence of a compactness requirement also reduces the
share of competitive districts and responsiveness, perhaps because compact
districts pack Democrats without producing the countervailing benefits of districtsubdivision congruence.109
2. U.S. State Legislatures
Finally, competitiveness requirements have been employed by seven states in
sixty-five state legislative elections. Commissions are the institutions that most
often have decided to impose these requirements, though they also have been
applied by courts and, on one occasion, a legislature. Most of the states that have
used the requirements are again located in the West.110 As noted earlier, state
legislative plans usually have many more districts than congressional plans, a fact
that makes calculations of both partisan fairness and competitiveness substantially
more reliable for the former.111
As with congressional elections, descriptive statistics tell quite a positive
story about the impact of competitiveness requirements at the state legislative
level. The average margin of victory is lower in elections with them than in
elections without them (42.0% versus 50.7%); the proportion of races decided by
less than twenty points is higher (34.8% versus 29.8%); and the level of electoral
responsiveness is higher as well (1.93 versus 1.54). All of these differences are
statistically significant.112 The density curves displayed in Figure 8 also are more

107. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 37 (summarizing literature finding that commission usage
increases responsiveness and has indeterminate effects on competitiveness).
108. See id. at 824, 829–31 (summarizing literature consistent with this result).
109. In addition, the Democratic share of the statewide vote is linked positively to the average
margin of victory, though only at the ten percent level. This may be because when Democrats do
particularly well in a state many of their votes are cast in very safe urban districts. See supra note 16.
The 2000 cycle also seems to have been especially uncompetitive, as the dummy variable for this cycle
was linked negatively to the share of competitive districts. Lastly, unlike with the partisan fairness
models, the regression results lose their intelligibility when the universe of cases is further limited to
states with at least ten congressional districts. See supra note 16 . This is because most states that have
used competitiveness requirements have had fewer than ten districts.
110. See supra Figure 2.
111. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
112. A two-sample t-test for average margin of victory yields t = 5.86 and p = 0.0000. A twosample t-test for the share of districts decided by less than twenty points yields t = 3.49 and p =
0.0004. And a two-sample t-test for electoral responsiveness yields t = 3.67 and p = 0.0002. As
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striking than their congressional equivalents. It is now evident that the averagemargin-of-victory curve for elections with competitiveness criteria is to the left of
the curve for elections without them; that the share-of-competitive-districts curve
for elections with the criteria is to the right of the curve for elections without
them; and that the responsiveness curve for elections with the criteria is also to the
right of the curve for elections without them. In the last two plots, the use of
competitiveness criteria seems to cleanly shift the entire distribution to the right,
in the direction of greater competition.
Figure 8: Density Curves for U.S. State Legislative Elections, Average Margin of
Victory, Share of Competitive Districts, and Electoral Responsiveness, 1967–2010

In all of the analysis to this point, the presence of a consequentialist criterion
was statistically insignificant, or significant only at the ten percent level, when
controls were added for other relevant factors. Here, however, the presence of a
competitiveness requirement remains a significant predictor of the average margin
of victory (at the ten percent level), the share of competitive districts, and the level
of electoral responsiveness after I control for the usual array of variables. This is
the only potential success for consequentialist criteria identified by this Article. In
state legislative elections (but not in congressional elections), competitiveness
criteria (but not partisan fairness criteria) may indeed result in their desired
consequences. Controlling for other pertinent factors, they decrease the average

before, I omit states with multimember districts from my analysis because competitiveness metrics
cannot easily be calculated for plans that use such districts. See supra note 97.
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margin of victory (by 4.0%) and increase the proportion of competitive districts
(by 5.1%) as well as the level of responsiveness (by 0.40).113
Several other factors also have significant effects on competitiveness. As in
the congressional analysis, respect for political subdivisions has a pro-competitive
impact in all three models, while VRA coverage has an anticompetitive influence
in each case. The use of a court to draw district lines also increases
competitiveness in every model. Like commissions, courts have no particular
incentive to shield incumbents from electoral challenges. On the other hand,
respect for prior district cores, incumbent protection requirements, and the
presence of divided government all are linked to reduced competition.
Incumbents tend to benefit when their districts are kept largely intact after a round
of redistricting. They are even more heavily advantaged when their protection is
made an explicit line-drawing criterion. And when government is divided, both
parties are motivated to shelter their elected officials, thus suppressing
competition, since they lack the ability to enact a partisan gerrymander.114
III. IMPLICATIONS
The empirical results reported above have important implications both for
the partisan fairness and competitiveness approaches and for redistricting reform
in general. It is to these implications that I turn in this Part. With respect to the
two consequentialist approaches, the dominant theme of the analysis is their
inability to produce their desired consequences. However, there are some grounds
for optimism in the efficiency differential models and in the competitiveness
models for state legislative elections. Consequentialist criteria may usually be
ineffective because of their poor drafting, low prioritization, and need for
unrealistically accurate electoral forecasting. But they do enjoy some success in
reducing the efficiency differential (probably a better metric than partisan bias),
and in increasing the competitiveness of state legislative elections (probably the
domain best suited to consequentialist line drawing).
With respect to redistricting reform generally, the clearest point to emerge is
the strong performance of neutral institutions. In both South Australia and the

113. See infra Table 5. These results persist when fixed effects are added for the year of the
election, but they cease to hold when fixed effects are added for both the state and year. The results
also hold when I use robust standard errors (at the five percent level for each metric), but they hold
only for responsiveness when I cluster standard errors by state. See supra note 90 (discussing use of
robust and clustered standard errors).
114. In addition, as in the congressional analysis, the Democratic share of the statewide vote is
linked to lower competitiveness. See supra note 109 . The number of districts in a state is also linked to
lower competitiveness, perhaps because when districts are especially small in population it is difficult
for them to be competitive. Consistent with findings that competition is decreasing in state legislative
elections, the election year has an anticompetitive effect as well. See Niemi et al., supra note 75, at 64–
67. Lastly, respect for communities of interest is linked to higher electoral responsiveness, while
compactness and partisan fairness requirements are linked to lower responsiveness.
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United States, the use of independent commissions is linked to greater partisan
fairness and greater competitiveness. The use of courts to draw district lines in the
United States has similarly positive consequences. Accordingly, institutional
change should be a higher priority for reformers than the adoption of
consequentialist approaches. The second point conveyed by the data is the unclear
efficacy (or worse) of many redistricting criteria. For example, compactness
requirements reduce both partisan fairness and competitiveness; respect for
communities of interest has almost no effect on any of the relevant metrics; and
the pro-competitive impact of respect for political subdivisions must be balanced
against the criterion’s link to lower partisan fairness. Institutional change thus
should also be a higher-priority goal than the enactment of conventional linedrawing requirements.
A. Consequentialist Approaches
The overarching conclusion of the empirical analysis was that, once other
relevant factors have been taken into account, consequentialist criteria have not
achieved their desired results. The differences in partisan bias and the efficiency
differential between South Australia and other Australian jurisdictions were not
statistically significant. Nor did South Australia experience any increases in
partisan symmetry after adopting its partisan fairness requirement in 1991. In the
United States, the presence of a partisan fairness criterion also did not have a
significant impact on partisan bias or the efficiency differential after controls for
other pertinent variables were added. In the regression models for congressional
elections, competitiveness was unaffected as well by the presence of a
competitiveness requirement.115
What accounts for this unimpressive record? Why don’t consequentialist
criteria seem to work? One answer is that they are often drafted so poorly that it is
difficult to discern what their authors sought to accomplish or how they are meant
to be enforced. For example, statutes in Delaware and Hawaii forbid district
plans that “unduly favor” a political party.116 It is entirely unclear how partisan
favoritism is supposed to be determined, let alone what level of favoritism is
undue. Similarly, authorities in California, New York, and Virginia have taken
“political fairness” into account in designing district plans, but without providing
any definition of this exceedingly vague term.117 And statements that
competitiveness was “considered,” as in Colorado, Florida, and Wisconsin, neither
explain what kind of competition was examined, nor specify how serious the

115. And even the limited successes of the efficiency differential models and the
competitiveness models in state legislative elections disappeared after fixed effects were added for the
state and year. See supra notes 85, 91, 98, 113.
116. See supra notes 45–46.
117. See supra notes 56, 58, 61.
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consideration was.118 It is not too surprising that consequentialist criteria of such
imprecision have been relatively ineffective.
Another explanation for the weak record of consequentialist criteria is the
low priority they often have been accorded relative to other requirements. For
instance, courts in California, Colorado, Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin designed
district plans largely on the basis of non-consequentialist criteria, and then took
partisan fairness into account only after provisional districts already had been
drawn.119 As the Texas court commented in its discussion of its line-drawing
methodology, “Finally, we checked our plan against the test of general partisan
outcome.”120 Analogously, the relevant Arizona and Wisconsin laws both make
clear that competitiveness is subordinate to other redistricting criteria. The
Arizona constitution declares that “[t]o the extent practicable, competitive districts
should be favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals,”121
while the Wisconsin statute states that “[t]o the very limited extent that precise population
equality is unattainable, [the district plans] . . . giv[e] due consideration to . . .
competitive legislative districts.”122 Again, it is unsurprising that consequentialist
criteria that have been granted such low priority have had such limited effects.
A further reason why consequentialist criteria have not been very effective is
that election results—and in particular how they translate into measures of
partisan fairness and competitiveness—are quite difficult to forecast. In U.S.
congressional elections, for example, the correlation between the Democratic
share of the statewide vote in one election and the Democratic share in the
previous election averaged 0.80 between 1968 and 2010. But the correlations for
average margin of victory, share of competitive districts, responsiveness, and the
efficiency differential averaged only 0.63, 0.42, 0.24, and 0.45, respectively, over
the same period. These figures reveal a sufficiently high level of volatility that it is
hard to see how even the best-written and most highly-prioritized consequentialist
criteria could consistently achieve their desired results. Over the decade-long
lifespan of a district plan, competitiveness and partisan fairness tend to vary widely
and unpredictably, thus undoing even quite meticulous districting arrangements.123

118. See supra notes 62, 63, 68.
119. See Legislature of State of Cal. v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 38 (Cal. 1973); Avalos v.
Davidson, No. 01 CV 2897, 2002 WL 1895406, at *7–8 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2002); Good v. Austin, 800
F. Supp. 557, 566–67 (E. & W.D. Mich. 1992); Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL
36403750, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2001); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 871 (W.D.
Wis. 1992) (per curiam).
120. Balderas, 2001 WL 36403750, at *3 (emphasis added).
121. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F) (emphasis added).
122. WIS. STAT. § 4.001(3) (repealed 2011) (emphasis added).
123. I did not include elections held under district plans that differed from those used in the
previous elections (i.e., 1972, 1982, 1992, 2002, and 2012). I also did not include district plans with
fewer than five districts. Partisan bias is the one metric that does seem to be quite predictable, with an
average correlation of 0.86 from election to election. The equivalent correlations for state legislative
elections are 0.81 for average margin of victory, 0.64 for share of competitive districts, 0.54 for
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The difficulty of predicting election results is also why South Australia’s
partisan fairness requirement has not functioned as well as might have been
expected. As Jenni Newton-Farrelly has explained, the South Australian commission relies on past election results as well as the uniform swing assumption to
design its district plans.124 This approach worked well for the four elections
between 1993 and 2006, in which candidates associated with the party that won a
majority of the statewide vote always won a majority of the statewide seats.125
However, the commission’s efforts misfired dramatically in 2010, when the ALP
received 48.4% of the statewide vote but 57.4% of the statewide seats, resulting in
a partisan bias of 7.4% and an efficiency differential of 10.6%. What went wrong
was that the ALP’s vote share did not swing uniformly across all districts. Instead,
“[t]he ALP ran the most successful defensive marginal seats campaign seen in
South Australia,” so that “the biggest swings occurred in safe Labor seats and in
fairly safe Liberal seats,” while marginal Labor seats barely swung at all.126 Not
even the world’s best partisan fairness requirement could succeed in the face of
such clever campaign tactics and unequal resulting swings.
A final possibility is that consequentialist criteria do work but the metrics I
calculated were too unreliable or the analytical techniques I used were too crude to
pick up their effects. I estimated partisan fairness and competitiveness using
standard measures of the two concepts as well as data from actual legislative
elections. It is plausible that more advanced metrics (e.g., partisan bias computed
without reliance on the uniform swing assumption127) or other data (e.g.,
presidential election results aggregated by district128) would have led to different
conclusions. Similarly, I sought to determine the effects of consequentialist criteria
using conventional ordinary least squares regressions that included controls for

responsiveness, 0.48 for partisan bias, and 0.51 for the efficiency differential. When I ran the various
regression models using only elections held immediately after a round of redistricting, more of the
variance was explained in each case, but the presence of consequentialist criteria was no more
significant. Line drawers thus seem unable to increase partisan fairness or competitiveness even in
elections that are held just months after their district plans have been completed. Cf. Gelman & King,
supra note 4, at 548, 550 (finding that bias tends to be stickier over time than responsiveness in state
legislative elections).
124. See Newton-Farrelly, Gerry-Built, supra note 18, at 475–80 (discussing South Australian
commission’s methodology).
125. However, in 2002 a third-party member who was expected to support the Liberals
actually voted for a Labor government, thus giving Labor control of the state parliament even though
the party had received a minority of the statewide vote. See Newton-Farrelly, Wrong Winner, supra note
18, at 3–4.
126. Id. at 5; see also Newton-Farrelly, Blindfolds, supra note 18, at 3.
127. See Gelman & King, supra note 4, at 521–23. However, “the uniform partisan swing
assumption does hold approximately in a vast array of democratic elections in the U.S.” Grofman &
King, supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added).
128. See supra note 40. However, the regressions I ran using this data at the congressional level
were less illuminating, and presidential election results aggregated by district are unavailable at the state
legislative level.
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relevant variables. It is again plausible that the results would have been different
had I used other analytical techniques (e.g., difference-in-differences analysis129) or
additional controls (e.g., the geographic distribution of partisan support across a
state130). However, my sense from experimenting with these and other approaches
is that this Article’s null findings are quite robust. Though I cannot be sure, I
would be surprised if better data or more sophisticated techniques would
determine that consequential criteria actually are successful.
A relative bright spot in this gloomy picture is the performance of partisan
fairness requirements in the efficiency differential models. In two of the three sets
of elections that I examined—Australian and U.S. congressional—the presence of
a partisan fairness criterion was statistically significant at the ten percent level,
even after controlling for other relevant factors.131 The requirement’s presence
reduced the efficiency differential by 5.6% in Australian elections and by 2.6% in
U.S. congressional elections.132 Too much should not be made of these results,
since the requirement’s presence did not attain the standard five percent
significance level. But it does seem that partisan fairness criteria are not entirely
useless, and it is also unsurprising that these criteria would have a greater impact
on the efficiency differential than on partisan bias. As discussed above, the
efficiency differential is calculated using actual election results rather than the
outcome of a hypothetical fifty-fifty election, and it takes into account wasted votes
rather than gaps between the parties’ seats.133 According to its creator, Eric
McGhee, these attributes make it a more sensitive measure of partisan fairness
than bias134—and may explain why it responds to the presence of a partisan
fairness requirement while bias does not.
The more important exception to the poor record of consequentialist criteria
is the performance of competitiveness requirements in state legislative elections.
Controlling for other pertinent variables, the presence of a competitiveness
requirement was linked to a statistically significant decrease in the average margin
of victory (by 4.0%) as well as statistically significant increases in the share of
competitive districts (by 5.1%) and the level of electoral responsiveness (by
0.40).135 One explanation for this finding is that competitiveness may be easier to
129. However, it is difficult to select appropriate jurisdictions and time periods for differencein-differences analysis, and my experiments with the technique did not yield any especially interesting
results.
130. However, there is no well-accepted method for measuring this distribution. Cf.
Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1936–41 (introducing technique for measuring spatial diversity of
individual districts).
131. See infra Tables 1–2. However, the requirement’s presence lost its statistical significance in
both cases once fixed effects were added for the state and year. See supra notes 85, 91.
132. See infra Tables 1–2.
133. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
134. See McGhee, supra note 72, at 23–25.
135. See infra Table 5. However, the requirement’s presence also lost its statistical significance
once fixed effects were added for the state and year. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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forecast than partisan fairness. Measures of competitiveness are derived more
directly from election results than are measures of partisan fairness, which require
the consideration of vote-to-seat conversion as well.136 Predictable factors like
incumbency also have a large influence on the competitiveness of individual
districts. Perhaps for these reasons, the correlations from election to election in
state legislative races were higher for all three competitiveness metrics I used than
for either metric of partisan fairness.137
The election level is the second potential explanation for the effectiveness of
competitiveness requirements in state legislative races. As noted earlier, state
legislative plans have many more districts than congressional plans, a fact that
improves the reliability of electoral metrics that are calculated for the former.138
This improved reliability explains why the state legislative models all were able to
explain more of the variance in the dependent variables than the congressional
models.139 It also explains why the metrics’ correlations from election to election
were generally higher in state legislative races than in congressional races.140
Beyond their larger numbers of districts, the stakes are lower in state legislative
elections as well. Most state chambers are not closely divided between the parties,
meaning that control of a chamber rarely hinges on the effectiveness of a partisan
gerrymander.141 Even where control of a chamber does so hinge, it is only a single
state house or state senate that is at stake—not the U.S. House of Representatives.
It may therefore be easier for state legislative line drawers to prioritize
consequentialist criteria than for their congressional counterparts. Lower stakes
may be conducive to the achievement of goals other than partisan or bipartisan
advantage.142
In sum, the overall record of consequentialist criteria is poor, likely because
of their shoddy drafting, low prioritization, and need for unrealistically accurate
electoral forecasts. But there is a glimmer of hope in the ability of partisan fairness
requirements to reduce the efficiency differential in two of the three sets of
136. This is particularly the case for average margin of victory and the share of competitive
districts. Like the partisan fairness metrics, responsiveness does require the consideration of vote-toseat conversion, through using actual election results rather than the outcome of a hypothetical fiftyfifty election. See supra note 77.
137. See supra note 123; see also Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting and Competitive Districts, in
THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra
note 21, at 222, 238 (arguing, based on author’s own redistricting experience, that “it is possible to
devise a working definition of a competitive district that will foster competitive elections”).
138. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
139. See infra Tables 2–5.
140. See supra note 123.
141. Over the period from 1968 to 2010, the parties’ respective seat shares came within
twenty points of each other in state legislative chambers only about forty percent of the time. In
contrast, the parties’ respective seat shares in Congress were this close about eight percent of the time
over the same period.
142. See Cain et al., supra note 70, at 1 (“[R]edistricting [criteria] can be much more potent in
the larger number of state legislative districts.”).
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elections that I studied. This ability likely stems from the measure’s greater
sensitivity relative to the more common partisan bias metric. And there is even
more reason for optimism in the performance of competitiveness requirements in
state legislative elections. Whether because competitiveness is easier to forecast
than partisan fairness, or because state legislative elections are a more favorable
setting than congressional elections, competition indeed is meaningfully more
vigorous when district plans are designed using competitiveness criteria.
B. Other Approaches
The analysis presented in Part II sheds light on not only the performance of
consequentialist approaches, but also the records of other popular proposals for
redistricting reform. The most common such proposal (and one that I have
defended in earlier work143) is the use of independent institutions, such as
commissions, to enact district plans. The reasoning is that actors who are
personally unaffected by redistricting should be able to draw better districts than
self-interested politicians. Neutral plans should command greater popular
legitimacy, they should better comply with whatever criteria apply to the linedrawing process—and they should be fairer to the major parties and more
competitive as well.144
Consistent with these expectations, South Australia experienced dramatic
improvements in both partisan fairness and competitiveness after adopting its
independent commission in 1975. As noted earlier, partisan bias fell from 9.0% in
1950–1975 to 3.6% in 1977–2010, while the efficiency differential fell from 5.7%
to 3.5%.145 Similarly, the average margin of victory fell from 29.3% to 24.6%, the
share of competitive districts rose from 33.1% to 42.7%, and the level of electoral
responsiveness rose from 1.4 to 2.2. Some of this progress is likely due to South
Australia’s simultaneous embrace of the one-person, one-vote rule, but some of it
also must be attributed to the state’s institutional reforms.
Another illuminating comparison is between all elections in Australia (where
all states use commissions) and elections in the United States. With respect to
partisan fairness, as Figure 9 indicates, partisan bias has averaged 4.6% in Australia
and the efficiency differential has averaged 7.0%. The equivalent figures are 6.6%
and 9.8% in U.S. state legislative elections, and 8.2% and 10.1% in U.S.
congressional elections. With respect to competitiveness, as Figure 9 also displays,
the average margin of victory has averaged 20.0% in Australia, the share of
competitive districts has averaged 55.3%, and the level of electoral responsiveness
has averaged 2.84. The equivalent figures are 50.4%, 30.0%, and 1.55 in U.S. state
legislative elections, and 39.7%, 28.7%, and 1.46 in U.S. congressional elections.

143.
144.
145.

See Stephanopoulos, supra note 37, at 795–806.
See id. (making these arguments).
See supra Part II.B.1.

704

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:669

These are stark differences, especially for competitiveness, with Australia holding
the advantage in every case. Australian and American elections both use singlemember districts, first-past-the-post voting, and the one-person, one-vote rule,
and they both are dominated by two parties. The most glaring difference between
the systems—the Australian embrace of redistricting commissions—thus likely
accounts for a good deal of the Australian edge in partisan fairness and
competitiveness.
Figure 9: Partisan Fairness and Competitiveness Metrics
for Australian and American Elections

Further support for the efficacy of independent institutions comes from the
various U.S.-specific regression models. With respect to partisan fairness,
commission usage had a statistically significant downward impact on the efficiency
differential in state legislative elections (by 2.1%). Similarly, reliance on a court to
draw district lines lowered partisan bias (by 1.3%) and the efficiency differential
(by 2.7%) in state legislative elections, and partisan bias in congressional elections
too (by 2.0%).146 With respect to competitiveness, commission usage reduced the
average margin of victory (by 8.9%) and increased the share of competitive
districts (by 9.9%) and the level of electoral responsiveness (by 0.99) in
congressional elections.147 Analogously, reliance on a court reduced the average
margin of victory (by 9.1%) and increased the share of competitive districts (by
6.7%) and the level of electoral responsiveness (by 0.45) in state legislative

146.
147.

See infra Tables 2–3.
See infra Table 4.
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elections.148 The upshot is that in just about every model I considered, one of the
key causes of appealing electoral outcomes was the use of a commission or court
to draw district lines.
To be sure, this Article’s results do not present an airtight case for
independent institutions. It is unclear whether South Australia’s post-1975 gains
should be attributed to its adoption of a commission or its espousal of the oneperson, one-vote rule. The Australian and American electoral systems differ not
only in their reliance on commissions, but also in their use of mandatory voting
(yes in Australia, no in America), their use of preferential voting (same), and their
basic structure (parliamentary versus presidential). And the coefficients for
commission and court usage in the U.S. regression models were often small, and
there is no good explanation why these factors varied in their significance from
model to model. But despite these caveats, the record of independent institutions
is undeniably positive. To a much greater extent than consequentialist criteria, they
actually produce improvements in both partisan fairness and competitiveness.149
Reformers concerned about electoral outcomes, both in America and abroad, thus
would be well advised to focus their energies on institutional change, not the
adoption of outcome-oriented line-drawing requirements.
The other common proposal for redistricting reform is the enactment of
conventional criteria such as compactness, respect for political subdivisions,
respect for communities of interest, and respect for prior district cores.150 The
logic is that if redistricting authorities must abide by such requirements, they will
be unable simultaneously to pursue partisan advantage or suppress competition.
Reduced discretion will produce better election results. In addition, compliance
with some of these criteria often is thought to have independent normative value.
For instance, several scholars (myself included151) have argued that when districts
are congruent with communities of interest, voters are more motivated to
participate in politics, and elected officials are better able to represent their
constituents.
This Article does not contribute to the debate about the participatory or
representational implications of conventional redistricting criteria. It does,
however, offer several grounds for skepticism as to the ability of these criteria to
improve partisan fairness and competitiveness by limiting line drawers’ discretion.
In the various U.S.-specific regression models, the record of the criteria was mixed
148. See infra Table 5.
149. This Article’s findings are confirmed by the existing political science literature. See
Stephanopoulos, supra note 37, at 799–802 (summarizing work on implications of commission usage
for partisan bias, responsiveness, and competitiveness).
150. I also include data on incumbency protection in my regression models, but it is a less
common criterion and also one that clearly is not rooted in a desire to promote partisan fairness or
competitiveness.
151. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 1379, 1390–97 (2012); Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1941–48.
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at best, and sometimes even counterproductive. Beginning with compactness, all
of its statistically significant effects were in an undesirable direction. The presence
of a compactness requirement increased the efficiency differential in state
legislative elections, reduced the share of competitive districts and the level of
electoral responsiveness in congressional elections, and reduced responsiveness in
state legislative elections as well.152 Whatever the aesthetic benefits may be of
compact districts, they apparently do not translate into electoral improvements.
To the contrary, compact districts tend to pack Democrats and to result in unfair
and uncompetitive district plans.
The situation is more ambiguous with respect for political subdivisions. The
requirement had a clear pro-competitive effect, reducing the average margin of
victory and increasing the share of competitive districts and the level of electoral
responsiveness in both congressional and state legislative elections.153 But the
requirement also increased partisan bias in state legislative elections.154 These
results arguably are reconcilable because adherence to subdivision boundaries may
pack Democrats in certain districts (thus increasing partisan bias) while generally
making it easier for challengers to convey their messages to voters (thus increasing
competitiveness). But even if the results can be squared, they still present
reformers with an unwelcome choice between partisan fairness and
competitiveness. Gains cannot be made along both dimensions by mandating that
districts coincide with political subdivisions.
Next, respect for communities of interest seems to be a largely toothless
requirement, at least in terms of its electoral consequences. The requirement had
no meaningful impact on partisan fairness, and its only statistically significant
effect in the competitiveness models was to increase responsiveness in state
legislative elections.155 Earlier work of mine, using more sophisticated conceptions
of district-community congruence, has produced more favorable results,156 but it
does appear that the mere presence of a community-of-interest criterion is mostly
ineffectual. Finally, respect for prior district cores, like compactness, has only
adverse effects. The requirement increased partisan bias and the average margin of
victory and decreased the share of competitive districts and the level of electoral
responsiveness in state legislative elections.157 By freezing in place existing district

152. See infra Tables 3–5.
153. See infra Tables 4–5.
154. See infra Table 3.
155. See infra Tables 2–5.
156. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 151, at 1459–62 (finding that community-of-interest
requirement with three gradations had positive implications for partisan bias and electoral
responsiveness in 2002 state legislative elections); Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1963–66 (finding
that spatial diversity, a proxy for district-community congruence, is linked in expected directions to
bias and responsiveness).
157. See infra Tables 3, 5.
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plans, the requirement evidently advantages incumbents who have thrived under
the status quo and prevents partisan imbalances from being corrected.
Once again, these findings should be taken with a grain of salt. Like
consequentialist criteria, conventional requirements are often poorly drafted and
subordinate to other redistricting considerations. It is quite possible that they
would perform better if they were written more clearly or prioritized more highly.
Similarly, the presence of a requirement that districts be designed in a certain
manner does not guarantee that they actually will be drawn in this way.158 Districtcommunity congruence itself, for example, may have very different consequences
than an ostensible rule that districts must respect communities of interest.159 Still,
it is indisputable that the record of conventional redistricting criteria is mediocre
at best. Reformers who hope to increase the partisan fairness and competitiveness
of elections clearly should turn their attention elsewhere—above all to improving
the institutions responsible for redistricting.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of the partisan fairness and competitiveness approaches is
arguably the most important development of the last generation in the
redistricting domain. But while much scholarly attention has been devoted to the
approaches’ theoretical merits, almost none has yet been paid to a simpler (but
perhaps more vital) question: How well do consequentialist criteria actually work?
This Article has sought to answer this query by compiling a comprehensive list of
jurisdictions that have used the criteria and then calculating measures of partisan
fairness and competitiveness for a large set of Australian and American elections.
Unfortunately for their proponents, the main finding of this analysis is that
consequentialist criteria do not work very well. Controlling for other relevant
variables, they typically do not make elections meaningfully fairer or more
competitive.
Two bright spots in this picture are that consequentialist criteria do increase
fairness along one of the two metrics I used, and that they do increase
competitiveness in U.S. state legislative elections. An optimist may therefore be
forgiven for speculating that the criteria would perform even better if only they
were drafted more precisely, prioritized more highly, or based on better election
forecasts. A more robust finding, however, is that electoral outcomes actually can
be improved by not taking electoral predictions directly into account.
Consequentialist criteria themselves are largely ineffective, but the use of
independent redistricting institutions, such as commissions and courts, is quite

158. See Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation, 4 ST. POL.
& POL’Y Q. 415, 428–29 (2004) (noting difficulty of assessing “the manner in which or even whether
[redistricting criteria] were implemented”); Forgette et al., Un-Principled Politics, supra note 37, at 13.
159. See supra note 156.
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effective indeed. According to data from both Australia and America,
commission- and court-drawn plans are substantially fairer and more competitive
than plans devised by self-interested politicians. Ironically, it seems that
consequentialist criteria cannot achieve their own desired consequences—but that
non-consequentialist approaches can.
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Appendix:
Table 1: South Australia Partisan Fairness Models
Variables

Model 1: Partisan Bias
(Absolute Value)

Partisan fairness
requirement

0.016

Year

0.00056 (0.00062)

Level of election

0.0079

(0.021)

(0.022)

Model 2: Efficiency Differential
(Absolute Value)
0.056

(0.033)*

0.00035

(0.00096)

0.034

(0.034)

Number of districts

0.00021 (0.00035)

0.00089

(0.00054)

ALP share of twoparty vote

0.036

(0.091)

0.47

(0.14)***

1.19

(1.24)

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

1.03

(1.93)

66

66

0.039

0.23

Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2: U.S. House of Representatives Partisan Fairness Models
Variables
Partisan fairness requirement

Model 1: Partisan Bias
(Absolute Value)
0.014

(0.015)

Model 2: Efficiency Differential (Absolute Value)
0.026

(0.015)*

Compactness requirement

0.0028 (0.012)

0.0023

(0.011)

Political subdivision
preservation requirement

0.0048 (0.014)

0.0034

(0.014)

Community of interest
preservation requirement

0.0041 (0.016)

0.0045

(0.016)

Respect for prior district core
requirement

0.0089 (0.015)

0.020

(0.015)

Incumbent protection
requirement

0.0070 (0.018)

0.00089 (0.018)

Competitiveness requirement

0.029

(0.016)*

Voting Rights Act coverage

0.011

(0.011)

Legislature responsible –
divided government

0.014

(0.011)

Commission responsible

0.014

(0.014)

0.0057

(0.014)

Court responsible

0.020

(0.011)*

0.0082

(0.011)

0.0087 (0.040)

0.11

(0.040)***

Number of districts

0.00048 (0.00041)

0.0018

Year

0.00075 0.0014)

0.00028 (0.0014)

Democratic share of two-party
vote

0.030

(0.016)*

0.0053
0.021

(0.011)
(0.011)*

(0.00041)***

2000 cycle

0.017

(0.016)

0.012

(0.016)

2010 cycle

0.040

(0.026)

0.024

(0.026)

Constant

1.59

(2.75)

0.64

(2.73)

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

334

334

0.022

0.063

Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Legislature responsible – unified government is the omitted institutional variable. 1990 cycle is the
omitted date variable.
Only states with at least five congressional districts included.
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Table 3: U.S. State Legislative Partisan Fairness Models
Variables

Model 1: Partisan Bias
(Absolute Value)

Partisan fairness requirement

0.00025

(0.0057)

0.013

Compactness requirement

0.0022

(0.0040)

0.012

Political subdivision

0.015

(0.0044)***

Model 2: Efficiency Differential (Absolute Value)
(0.0084)
(0.0058)**

0.0025

(0.0065)

(0.0041)

0.0013

(0.0060)

(0.0081)***

0.0054

(0.012)

0.021

(0.0090)**

0.019

(0.013)

Competitiveness requirement

0.0081

(0.0075)

0.015

(0.011)

Voting Rights Act coverage

0.0025

(0.0049)

0.017

(0.0071)**

0.0048

(0.0044)

Commission responsible

0.0013

(0.0047)

0.021

(0.0068)***

Court responsible

0.013

(0.0053)**

0.027

(0.0077)***

0.098

(0.015)***

0.18

(0.022)***

preservation requirement
Community of interest

0.0060

preservation requirement
Respect for prior district core

0.022

requirement
Incumbent protection
requirement

Legislature responsible –

0.0030

(0.0063)

divided government

Democratic share of twoparty vote
Number of districts
Year

0.00026
0.00037

(0.000034)***
(0.00055)

0.00025
0.00072

(0.000050)***
(0.00080)

2000 cycle

0.00098

(0.0063)

0.0088

(0.0092)

Constant

0.73

(1.10)

1.44

(1.60)

Observations

802

802

Adjusted R-squared

0.13

0.15

Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Legislature responsible – unified government is the omitted institutional variable. 1990 cycle is
the omitted date variable.
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Table 4: U.S. House of Representatives Competitiveness Models
Variables

Competitiveness

Model 1: Average
Margin of Victory

Model 2: Share of
Model 3: Electoral
Competitive Districts Responsiveness

0.0021 (0.029)

0.040

(0.039)

0.067

(0.30)

0.0093 (0.021)

0.079

(0.028)**

0.45

(0.22)**

(0.026)***

0.17

(0.035)**

0.76

(0.27)***

0.034

(0.029)

0.033

(0.039)

0.15

(0.30)

0.032

(0.028)

0.059

(0.037)

0.37

(0.28)

0.047

(0.033)

0.0023 (0.044)

0.083

(0.33)

0.024

(0.028)

0.028

(0.037)

0.40

(0.28)

0.12

(0.020)***

0.079

(0.026)**

0.33

(0.20)*

requirement
Compactness
requirement
Political subdivision

0.11

preservation
requirement
Community of
interest preservation
requirement
Respect for prior
district core
requirement
Incumbent
protection
requirement
Partisan fairness
requirement
Voting Rights Act
coverage
Legislature

0.0090 (0.021)

0.0085 (0.028)

0.033

(0.21)

0.99

(0.26)***

0.082

(0.21)

responsible – divided
government
Commission

0.089 (0.025)***

0.099

(0.034)**

responsible
Court responsible
Democratic share of

0.0039 (0.020)
0.14

(0.07)**

0.0012 (0.027)
0.15

(0.098)

0.3

(0.76)

two-party vote
Number of districts

0.00059 (0.00076)

Year

0.00095 (0.0025)

0.00047 (0.0010)
0.0022 (0.0034)

0.0066 (0.0078)
0.026

(0.026)
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Table 4 (continued)
Variables

Model 1: Average
Margin of Victory

Model 2: Share of
Model 3: Electoral
Competitive Districts Responsiveness

2000 cycle

0.014

(0.029)

0.099

(0.039)**

0.096

(0.30)

2010 cycle

0.026

(0.048)

0.093

(0.065)

0.035

(0.50)

Constant

1.59

(5.05)

3.96

(6.76)

54.4

(51.9)

Observations

334

334

334

Adjusted R-squared

0.22

0.17

0.12

Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Legislature responsible – unified government is the omitted institutional variable. 1990 cycle is
the omitted date variable.
Only states with at least five congressional districts included.
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Table 5: U.S. State Legislative Competitiveness Models

Variables

Competitiveness
requirement
Compactness
requirement

Model 1: Average
Margin of Victory
0.040 (0.021)*

0.012 (0.012)

Model 2: Share of
Competitive Districts
0.051 (0.020)**

0.011 (0.011)

Model 3: Electoral
Responsiveness
0.40 (0.14)***

0.12 (0.072)*

Political subdivision
preservation

0.080 (0.013)***

0.063 (0.012)***

0.30 (0.081)***

0.016 (0.011)

0.15 (0.074)**

requirement
Community of
interest preservation

0.0097 (0.012)

requirement
Respect for prior
district core

0.061

(0.023)***

0.053 (0.022)**

0.31 (0.15)**

0.11

(0.026)***

0.044 (0.024)*

0.19 (0.16)

0.0020 (0.017)

0.026 (0.016)*

0.20 (0.10)*

0.10

(0.014)***

0.069 (0.013)***

0.40 (0.088)***

0.031

(0.013)**

0.025 (0.012)**

0.20 (0.079)**

0.0018 (0.013)

0.022 (0.085)

requirement
Incumbent
protection
requirement
Partisan fairness
requirement
Voting Rights Act
coverage
Legislature
responsible –
divided government
Commission
responsible
Court responsible
Democratic share of
two-party vote
Number of districts

0.012 (0.014)
0.091 (0.015)***
0.14

(0.042)***

0.00058
(0.000098)***

0.067 (0.014)***

0.45 (0.096)***

0.093 (0.040)**

0.55 (0.27)**

0.0005

0.0029

(0.000092)***

(0.00062)***
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Table 5 (continued)
Variables
Year

Model 1: Average
Margin of Victory
0.0039 (0.0016)**

Model 2: Share of
Competitive Districts

Model 3: Electoral
Responsiveness

0.0035 (0.0015)**

0.026 (0.0099)***

2000 cycle

0.037 (0.018)**

0.031 (0.017)*

0.26 (0.11)**

Constant

7.42

7.27 (2.96)**

53.53 (19.86)***

(3.15)**

Observations

802

802

802

Adjusted R-squared

0.34

0.22

0.17

Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Legislature responsible – unified government is the omitted institutional variable. 1990 cycle is
the omitted date variable.

